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Regulating for Responsibility: Reputation and Social Media 
 
 David Mangan* 
 
The framework brought forward by the United Kingdom’s Defamation Act 2013 
underlines a traditional hierarchy of expression in which news media is viewed as high-
level speech. Though a different form, social media is a dominant means of expression. 
The present study explores the rationale for a more robust and forceful discussion of 
responsibility in speech on social media platforms. The underlying premise here is that 
speech should be viewed as a qualified good and that a more appropriate paradigm is one 
found in the phrase freedom to participate.   
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I. Introduction 
The imperative in recalibrating the balance between rights and responsibilities is 
recognizable in the regulation of new technology. Social media, as an example of user-
generated platforms, allow an unprecedented scope for expression and the question of 
regulation has been a matter of debate.1. Speech has traditionally been justified by the 
argument of the good in free speech. With social media, this premise has been challenged 
anew.2   
                                                 
*
  
1
 See for example, D. Mac Síthigh, ‘The mass age of internet law’ (2008) 17 Information & 
Communications Technology Law 79-94 [Mac Síthigh]. 
2
 The focus is on comments by identified individuals on social media; that is, persons who have made 
remarks on social media platforms but who have not employed an alias or anonymized identity. There are 
further significant issues regarding anonymous remarks and legal responsibility. For example, the Joint 
Committee on the Draft Defamation Bill, First Report: Draft Defamation Bill HL 203, HC 930-I (2011-
 2 
 
Discussions of responsibility often combine legal and philosophical considerations. 3 
Regarding legal responsibility, 4 libel law is concerned with the liability of those who are 
responsible for harming another’s reputation. The notion of responsibility is attenuated, 
however, by a belief that curbing free speech in any way begins a descent down the 
proverbial slippery slope; hence a pronounced reluctance to approach the drop. So 
important is freedom of expression that sanctions will not be imposed on remarks 
considered rude, unwarranted or even unfair. This means that the morality of speech is 
not a compelling basis for curbing remarks when regulating for legal responsibility. 
 
The current work discusses responsible use of social media and focuses on remarks 
published on social media platforms.5 English law (common law and in particular the 
Defamation Act 2013) will be used because the law has been reformed to expand 
protection of free expression at a time of enormous technological advancement in 
platforms for free speech. The topic contains different aspects and it is unpacked in this 
paper in the following manner. First, the framework for assessing impugned speech on 
these platforms depends largely upon defamation law. There are difficulties with 
defamation as a foundation; such as the vagaries of defining what is libel law and the 
troubled parameters set by the Defamation Act 2013. While the debate on what is the 
focus of libel law will likely persist, the problems presented by the statute betray a less 
than useful set of assumptions for a piece of twenty-first century legislation. Second, 
presumptions grounding the current state of the law are explored; that is, the ideas of free 
speech as an absolute good and social media speech as a less important form of speech.6 
Overall, the reformed English law of defamation has established a new dilemma. While it 
advances what may be called the freedom to participate, it does so along quite traditional 
lines. The current law not only ignores how social media (as one example of a user-
generated platform) actualizes in a remarkable manner the notion of participation in 
democracy, but it also undermines the elements of responsible publication evident in the 
law it replaced.  
 
                                                                                                                                                 
2012) [Joint Committee Report], [102] commented: ‘Anonymity may encourage free speech but it also 
discourages responsibility’. This topic is explored in other publications such as A. Vamialis, ‘Online 
defamation: confronting anonymity’ (2013) 21 International Journal of Law and Information Technology 
31-65.  
3
 Space does not permit an extended philosophical discussion of responsibility. Guidance on this point has 
been taken from the opening remarks in P. Cane, Responsibility in Law and Morality (Oxford: OUP, 2002). 
Discussions on the topic of responsibility generally flow from H.L.A. Hart’s taxonomy (a) role-
responsibility, (b) causal-responsibility, (c) liability-responsibility, and (d) capacity-responsibility: H.L.A. 
Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2008), 210-230. 
4
 There is much that can be done broadly in this area. For example, the notion of space may be challenged: 
D. Mac Síthigh,'Virtual walls: the law of pseudo-public spaces' (2012) 8 International Journal of Law in 
Context 394-412. 
5
 Though the discussion centres on words, this does not ignore the potential for pictures as a form of speech.  
6
 On the latter point, speech on social media falls within the rather disparaged area of user-generated 
content which one author has claimed is ‘destroying our culture’: A. Keen, The Cult of the Amateur  
(London: Nicholas Brealey, 2007). Another commentator has called social media a ‘disease’: R. Sanvenero, 
‘Social media and our misconceptions of the realities’ (2013) 22 Information & Communications 
Technology Law 89-108, 90. 
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II. The lingering problem: the role of defamation law 
Many users of social media contend these platforms are the equivalent of engaging in a 
conversation.7 For example, in Pridgen v University of Calgary8 the claimant argued: 
‘things that are said on here are not designed to be held up to intense scrutiny, it is merely 
the equivalent of having an online conversation.’ There are two difficulties with 
defamation as a foundation: the vagaries of defining what is libel law (explored in this 
section); and the troubled parameters set by the Defamation Act 2013 (explored in the 
immediately following section).9 
 
The title of Professor Barendt’s often-cited article summarizes the on-going dilemma, 
‘What is the point of libel law?’10 The twenty-first century version seems eager to protect 
a wide-range of speech. The current law (both common and statutory) suggests 
defamation regulate free speech in a light touch manner ensuring a marketplace of ideas 
with only minimal restrictions on what may not be published. And yet, there remains the 
lingering right to protection of reputation, embedded in Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights.11  
 
The defamation framework remains a challenging one to fit under the traditional tort 
considerations.12 For this reason the concept of responsibility in this tort is discussed in a 
different manner. In libel law, the scandalous comment is protected to ensure the greater 
good of unencumbered discussion. Lord Steyn in Reynolds v Times Newspapers Ltd.13 
foreshadowed this state of the law: ‘freedom of expression is the rule and regulation of 
speech is the exception requiring justification. The existence and width of any exception 
can only be justified if it is underpinned by a pressing social need. These are fundamental 
principles governing the balance to be struck between freedom of expression and 
defamation.’ In contrast, consider the following statement of tort law and responsibility:  
The basis of the driver’s being held responsible … is the driver’s careless injuring of the 
pedestrian. The same is true for a judgment entered against a manufacturer on a claim by a 
consumer who is injured by a poorly designed product, for a private citizen defamed by a 
                                                 
7
 A point reiterated in the UK: see for example S. Birkbeck, ‘Can the use of social media be regulated?’ 
(2013) 19 Computer and Telecommunications Law Review 83-85, 83.   
8
  2012 ABCA 138, [32] 
9
 Libel has been actionable per se but it is contended that with all claimants now needed to meet the 
threshold of seriousness in s.1 of the Defamation Act 2013 this is no longer the case. And so, what is 
characterized as converting libel into slander is to say that social media, as an online conversation, is a 
transcript of a conversation and as such places the ‘speakers’ in a more actionable position.  
10
 (1999) 52 Current Legal Problems 110-125 [Barendt]. The question remains unanswered as attested to 
by more recent publications: for example D. Howarth, ‘Libel: Its purpose and reform’ (2011) 74 Modern 
Law Review 845-877 [Howarth]; A. Mullis & A. Scott, ‘Reframing libel: taking (all) rights seriously and 
where it leads’ (2012) 63 Northern Ireland Legal Quarterly 5-25. The current reform package appears to 
fail in answering this question.   
11
 The adjective lingering is used here because the present state of the English law raises the potential for a 
ruling from Strasbourg reminding domestic courts of the balance between the two applicable rights. 
12
 This is not to overlook the persist challenges posed by discerning the objectives of tort: J. Morgan, Tort, 
Insurance and Incoherence’ (2004) 67 Modern Law Review 384-401; K. Oliphant, ‘Tort Law, Risk, and 
Technological Innovation in England’ (2014) 59 McGill Law Journal 819-845. 
13
 [2001] 2 AC 127 (HL) [Reynolds], 208. 
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magazine, for an investor defrauded by a swindler, and for a child molested by a 
caretaker.14 
In each of these examples, save the one about defamation, there is a clearly wrongful act 
committed by a defendant. To defame is also a wrongful act, but the boundary is not 
synergistic with moral wrongs.15 Speech garners greater latitude in English law because 
of its perceived value to society. In the above listing, then, the defamer stands out as one 
category of wrongdoer who sits uneasily with the others.  
 
Further distancing of libel from tort are questions surrounding the nature of reputation. 
Advocates of greater protection for free speech rely on the relativism of reputation to 
undercut protection for that right. 16  They argue protection for reputation should be 
limited because it is essentially a private issue and free speech is a public right.17 To these 
points Howarth’s response may be proffered:  
The content of reputations might well change as social and cultural conditions change, but 
that does not alter the fact that, at every moment throughout those changes, individuals have 
reputations the loss of which would do them harm. Even if individuals have no legitimate 
expectations that social and cultural conditions will remain unchanged, they do have a 
legitimate interest in the maintenance of their reputations for the time being.18 
The tension is between the protection of two rights – one deemed public and the other 
viewed as private. The crux of the difficulty in answering the question ‘what is the point 
of libel law?’ is set within the law’s mandate to balance these competing interests. And 
yet, legal developments in the UK have undercut the equal regard given to both 
protection of speech and reputation.19 Intensifying the issue, the multiple platforms of 
social media are emblems of free speech and, as a corollary, a challenge to reputational 
concerns (as well as giving rise to other considerations such as privacy).20 
 
                                                 
14
 J.C.P. Goldberg & B.C. Zipursky, ‘Tort Law and Responsibility’ in J. Oberdienk, The Philosophical 
Foundations of Tort Law (Oxford: OUP, 2014), 17. 
15
 Historically, an award of damages in defamation is made once liability is established and no defences are 
found to be applicable: D. Ibbetson, A Historical Introduction to the Law of Obligations (Oxford: OUP, 
1999), 115. The punitive nature is evident in this remedy but this is not a complete characterization for 
there is much ground to be covered before liability is established and defences are found in applicable.  
16
 User-generated content on the internet would seem to only further imperil reputation. danah boyd’s term 
‘persistent’ embodies the challenges here: d. boyd, ‘Social Network Sites as Networked Publics: 
Affordances, Dynamics, and Implications’ in Z. Papacharissi (ed) Networked Self: Identity, Community, 
and Culture on Social Network Sites (New York: Routledge, 2011), 39-58. 
17
 The wording of Binnie J in the Canadian Supreme Court decision of WIC Radio Ltd v Simpson [2008] 2 
SCR 420, [2], steels these critics: reputation is the ‘regrettable but unavoidable road kill on the highway of 
public controversy’. 
18
 D. Howarth, ‘Libel: Its purpose and reform’ (2011) 74 Modern Law Review 845-877, [Howarth], 849. 
Reference should also be made to Lord Nicholls’ remark in Reynolds that ‘Protection of reputation is 
conducive to the public good’: Reynolds, 201. Daniel Solove contends that reputation and freedom are 
interlinked: D.L. Solove, The Future of Reputation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007). 
19
 For an extended investigation see G. Phillipson, ‘The “global pariah”, the Defamation Bill and the 
Human Rights Act’ in D. Capper (ed.), Modern Defamation law: Balancing Reputation and Free 
Expression (Belfast: Queens University Belfast Press, 2012), 147-190 [Phillipson]. 
20
 With the prevalence of social media, it is posited that a positive reputation will be of increasing value 
where the commentator is viewed as a reliable and independent source of opinions and information. 
 5 
III. Troubled framework 
The Defamation Act 2013 is not an ideal source for those seeking guidance on 
responsible regulation of social media use.  
 
As legislation passed in the midst of remarkable technological advances in 
communication, the Act underwhelms. A defence for internet service providers (s.5) is 
the extent of acknowledgement of contemporary communications.21It deals more with 
anonymised defamatory remarks. The defence for website operators continues from the 
existing common law.22 The common law found liability where ‘there [was] knowing 
involvement in the process of publication of the relevant words.’23 Section 5(3) of the 
statute24 bears a similarity to the decision of the Court of Appeal in Tamiz.25 This is 
noteworthy when one considers that, through the 2013 Act, Parliament has overruled 
common law developments in two widely used defences. To be so readily informed by 
the common law here contributes to the mélange that is the Act. The impression arising 
from the Act is that the drafters believed online defamation would likely arise where the 
commentator hid behind anonymity. As will be seen, the Act places commentators using 
their own names in a better position, but only to an extent.  
 
With the Defamation Act 2013, Parliament has reset the common law and created a new 
baseline. It may be that guidance is derived from decisions prior to the Act’s passage, but 
their influence of these decisions is intentionally muted.26 The defence of honest opinion 
in s. 3 (which replaces the defence of fair comment)27 illustrates this. The Act requires 
the defendant to show that: (1) the statement complained of is a statement of opinion;28 
                                                 
21
 Section 5 works in tandem with s.10 which permits an action against an individual other than the author, 
editor or publisher only if ‘the court is satisfied that it is not reasonably practicable for an action to be 
brought against the author, editor or publisher.’ The Act also recognizes publication on a website in s.13. 
The Electronic Commerce Directive Dir. 2000/31/EC brought into force in the UK by the Electronic 
Commerce (EC Directive) Regulations 2002 SI 2002/2013 are also relevant in this instance. 
22
 See Godfrey v Demon Internet Ltd [2001] QB 201 (QB); the distinction made by Eady J. in Bunt v. Tilley 
[2006] 3 All ER 336 (QB) [Bunt], [12]: ‘[the defendant] had actively chosen to receive and store the 
newsgroup exchanges containing the posting, and it could not be accessed by its subscribers. It was within 
its power to obliterate the posting’; and subsequent decisions such as Metropolitan International Schools v 
Google and others [2009] EMLR 27 (QB), Davison v Habeeb [2011] EWHC 3031 and Tamiz v Google 
[2013] EWCA Civ 68 [Tamiz]. 
23
 Bunt, [23]. 
24
 (2) It is a defence for the operator to show that it was not the operator who posted the statement on the 
website. 
(3) The defence is defeated if the claimant shows that— 
(a) it was not possible for the claimant to identify the person who posted the statement, 
(b) the claimant gave the operator a notice of complaint in relation to the statement, and 
(c) the operator failed to respond to the notice of complaint in accordance with any provision 
contained in regulations. 
25
 The Court in Tamiz (at [16]) found that the capacity to moderate (i.e. remove specific comments) does 
not equate to liability. Subsequently, s.5(12) states: ‘The defence under this section is not defeated by 
reason only of the fact that the operator of the website moderates the statements posted on it by others.’ 
26
 Professor Phillipson has suggested that there are four avenues which courts may take regarding case law 
preceding the Act; though he also cites the Government’s view that this body of law would be for guidance: 
Phillipson, 162. 
27
 Section 3(8). 
28
 Section 3(2). 
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(2) the basis of opinion is generally or specifically referred to;29 (3) that an honest person 
could have held the opinion.30 According to s.3(4), in order to qualify for the defence, a 
defendant would need to show that an honest person could hold the same opinion either 
(a) based on facts in existence at the time of publication or (b) based on any privileged 
statement published prior to the impugned comment. The troubling aspect arises in (a) 
with the weakening of the sufficient factual basis requirement for the opinion. In Joseph v 
Spiller31 Lord Phillips wrote of the importance of the factual underpinning of comments 
at common law when he questioned how ‘a defendant can base a defence of honest 
opinion on a fact that was not instrumental in his forming the opinion that he expressed 
by his comment.’ 32  A less useful control mechanism is found in the 2013 Act: the 
commentator need only point to facts in existence at the time of the comment being made 
and it remains an open question whether the author needs to have known of them at the 
relevant moment. The Explanatory Notes to the Act do not require a connection between 
any relevant fact or facts and the formation of the (impugned) opinion. Despite the Notes’ 
suggestion, a link between the existing case law and the ‘requirement that “an honest 
person” must have been able to hold the opinion’ is at best tenuous.33 The broadened 
spectrum of commentary provides a breadth of protection by way of applicable defences 
because the author will need to only find ‘any fact which existed at the time the statement 
complained of was published’.34  
 
The public interest (which was a key aspect of the common law fair comment defence) 
has been muted in the statutory defense, although whether or not the matter is one of 
public interest remains a question for determination based on the facts of the case. It is 
now less clear whether public interest is a pre-requisite for statutory protection. The 
query stems from s.3(4)(b) which permits a privileged statement to form the basis of a 
comment attracting the defence; such a statement would include (based on s.3(7)(a)) an 
item protected by the defence of publication on a matter of public interest (set out in s.4 
of the Act). The overlap between the two defences will be returned to after outlining the 
public interest defence. 
 
Section 4 of the Act contains the new defence of responsible publication on a matter of 
public interest and is intended to replace Reynolds privilege.35  A defendant qualifies 
under this provision where the impugned statement was on a matter of public interest and 
the publication was handled in a responsible manner. There are subjective 36  and 
objective37 elements to this provision.38 The breadth afforded to this defence is wider than 
                                                 
29
 Section 3(3). 
30
 Section 3(4). 
31
 [2010] UKSC 53. 
32
 Spiller, [95]. The point was reiterated by the Court of Appeal in Cammish v. Hughes [2012] EWCA Civ 
1655, [23]. 
33
 Defamation Act 2013, Explanatory Notes, [23]. 
34
 Section 3(4)(a). 
35
 As identified in section 4(6): ‘The common law defence known as the Reynolds defence is abolished.’ 
36
 ‘(b) the defendant reasonably believed that publishing the statement complained of was in the public 
interest.’ 
37
 ‘(a) the statement complained of was, or formed part of, a statement on a matter of public interest’ 
38
 Defamation Act 2013, Explanatory Notes, [30]. 
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that for the common law defense of honest opinion: ‘For avoidance of doubt, the defence 
under this section may be relied upon irrespective of whether the statement complained 
of is a statement of fact or a statement of opinion.’39 Section 4(3) adds a notable (though 
confined) limitation.40 The House of Lords Select Committee examining the draft bill 
drew attention to an earlier version of the provision that repeated the non-exhaustive list 
provided by Lord Rodger in Reynolds. The Committee was concerned that the list would 
be viewed as a test and therefore repeat the circumstances outlined by the House of Lords 
in Jameel (Mohammed) v. Wall Street Journal Europe (SPRL);41 that is, the list was not 
to be applied strictly but as a guideline.42 (The provision also appears to preclude the 
court from finding that the publication was negligent in some way.) Again, a difficulty 
arises. Verifying facts (a hallmark of responsible publication) is not a necessary step to 
statutory protection. The Act does not outline a defence for facts that were checked. It 
says, in this situation, there is no need to check facts at all. In the social media context, 
s.4(3) could be viewed as beneficial to free discourse. If the platform permits users to 
freely contribute to discussions as they arise, a requirement for each contributor to check 
facts would seem to be onerous, if not chilling.  
 
As a summary comment, opinion is the darling of the Defamation Act 2013. Together 
sections 3 and 4 draw attention to opinions as speech; a matter underlined by s.4(5). The 
framework change promulgated by the legislation is a shift from what may have been 
called ‘responsible journalism’ (where decisions such as Reynolds, Jameel and Flood v 
Times Newspapers Ltd.43 spoke of free speech under a loose rubric of responsibility) to 
one of reasonable belief where authors of impugned comments need only have a 
reasonable belief as to the public interest and accuracy of the remarks. Hugh Tomlinson 
QC has written of the foreseeable difficulties:  
a person can reasonably believe that the publication of a statement is in the public interest 
without taking steps to verify its truth . . . if, for example, a journalist is told by a source 
that he believes to be reliable that a leading politician is corrupt, the journalist could 
reasonably believe that it was in the public interest to publish such an allegation without 
further investigation into its truth. It could even be argued that it was reasonable for a 
journalist to believe that publication is in the public interest where he has no positive belief 
in its truth but simply believes that because of its seriousness it is an allegation which 
should be published.44  
Whittled away are the remnants of concern for protection of reputation. The legislation 
even seems to deviate from the negligence standard. Howarth’s argument now seems to 
be in question: ‘As for the Reynolds defence, understanding the nature of the harm as 
                                                 
39
 Section 4(5). 
40
 It is not clear how this provision would affect the neutrality of reporting in the reportage defense. The 
Explanatory Notes to the Act stated at [32]: ‘In determining whether … it was reasonable for the defendant 
to believe that publishing the statement was in the public interest, the court should disregard any failure on 
the part of a defendant to take steps to verify the truth of the imputation conveyed by the publication (which 
would include any failure of the defendant to seek the claimant’s views on the statement.’ 
41
 [2007] 1 AC 359 (HL) [Jameel] 
42
 House of Lords Select Committee on the Constitution, Defamation Bill HL Paper 86 (London: TSO, 
2012), [11]-[13]. 
43
 [2012] 2 AC 273 (SC) [Flood]. Though the disparity between the Court of Appeal and the House of 
Lords/Supreme Court in each of Jameel and Flood underlines the on-going debate regarding accepted 
standards. 
44
 H. Tomlinson, ‘The Defamation Bill and a “Strong Public Interest Defence”’ Inforrm 22 November 2013. 
 8 
closer to personal injury than harm to economic interests should make it easier to see an 
important parallel … between the Reynolds defence and the test for carelessness, or 
breach of duty, in negligence, albeit with the burden of proof reversed.’45 Mullis and 
Scott contended that Parliament’s intention with the Defamation Act 2013 was for 
journalists to undertake the same efforts to corroborate a story as they would have under 
the common law Reynolds privilege. 46  The optimism of the proffered view is not 
necessarily shared. It remains an open question whether the common law prior to the 
Act’s passage would be of any force (even as guidance).47 It must be recalled that the 
Defamation Act 2013 constitutes a critique of the common law of libel. Rejecting two 
significant defences, it resets adjudication in the area. These are necessary considerations 
for anyone seeking to limit freedom of expression based on the Convention right to 
protection of reputation. The protection of opinions under section 4 appears to adopt (as 
Mullis and Scott pointed out) the standard in British Chiropractic Association v Singh48 
over the ‘preferable’ views of Lords Hobhouse and Nichols in Reynolds who maintained 
the separation between fair comment and Reynolds privilege. Arguments against free 
speech now must be fortified so that triers of fact may be steeled by the strength of 
reasoning in a ruling that may be viewed as contrary to the not-so-subtle tenor of the Act.   
 
Overall, the difficulty created here is that opinions are given pre-eminence, but the 
responsibility to be accurate or have some factual basis is overridden. The legislation is 
problematic because it affords an extra layer of protection for this form of discourse. 
Defendants (news media who have the resources to investigate stories) will most likely 
plead both ss.3 and 4 as defences where opinion is an issue because of the statutory 
interconnection. We may ask, ‘why are there two defences’ if opinion may be protected 
under either.  
 
Putting aside the unnecessary lack of clarity created by the Act, let us consider the Act as 
enshrining protection for inference by way of value judgements. This is laudable and 
perhaps even at the core of free expression: the free debate of topics and their 
implications; a spirited consideration of competing arguments. Was the common law not 
doing this already? In Singh, the concept was arguably entrenched within the common 
law. In Spiller, the criteria for protection of value judgements were loosened by the 
adoption of a more general referencing of facts within comments. There is an argument to 
be made that, though loose, this framework functioned because it permitted a spectrum of 
values to inform value judgements. In effect, it protected plurality and speech which 
                                                 
45
 Howarth, 868. A further query is raised in regards to the long-debated decision in Spring v Guardian 
Assurance Inc. [1995] 2 AC 296 (HL).  
46
 A. Mullis & A. Scott, ‘Tilting at Windmills: the Defamation Act 2013’ (2014) 77 Modern Law Review 
87-109, 107 [Mullis & Scott (2014)], 90 
47
 Lord Brown’s explication of Reynolds privilege: ‘could whoever published the defamation, given 
whatever they knew (and did not know) and whatever they had done (and had not done) to guard so far as 
possible against the publication of untrue defamatory material, properly have considered the publication in 
question to be in the public interest?’: Flood, [113]; cited in Mullis & Scott (2014), 91. 
48
 [2010] EWCA Civ 350. 
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contributed to on-going discussion. In its current form, the Act protects speech for the 
sake of making a comment.49  
 
IV. Categorising speech 
Underlying the discussion of social media and libel law are the notions of higher and 
lower forms of speech. 50  There are two constituent elements which are explored 
separately below. The first is the idea that free speech is in some way an absolute good; 
that is, promoting an unfettered spectrum for speech is a benefit to all. The second aspect 
attenuates the first: social media has been viewed as a lower form of speech. In regards to 
responsibility, both of these views have formative impact. Free speech as an absolute 
good is an argument used to liberalize regulation of speech based on publication by news 
media. The view that social media contains speech that should not garner the same level 
of protection as news media contradicts the argument for free speech as an absolute good. 
As a result, consideration of limitations on free speech and the associated challenges of 
drawing boundary lines have already been underway. 
 
(i) Challenging the idea of free speech as an absolute good 
The reforms in the UK to defamation law have emphasized the value of speech itself. 
Arguments regarding the worth of speech are more of a slogan than a reality. We do not 
view all speech as being of equal value. Political speech (critical of government) has been 
the classic example of the good in free speech.51 In Derbyshire County Council v. Times 
Newspapers Ltd., 52  the House of Lords underlined the point when it ruled that 
government bodies could not sue in defamation because of (among other points) the 
potential chilling effect such a potential could have on democracy; especially as a free 
press is seen as essential to democracy.53 These points focus on the public law aspects 
whereas social media speech draws particular attention to more individual legal 
considerations. 
 
There has been a division in the platforms for speech that has revealed a predisposition. 
Traditional news media speech is held in higher regard than that of individuals on social 
media. And so, the notion of free speech has developed in a particular direction.54 This 
                                                 
49
 The Act raises the question of how closely it protects ‘bare comments’ which were deemed beyond 
protection in Spiller, [89], where the Court identified justification as the only possible defense. Moreover 
the Joint Committee also recommended that bare opinions fall outside protection: Joint Committee Report, 
[69]. 
50
 J. Rowbottom, “To Rant, Vent and Converse: Protecting Low Level Digital Speech” (2012) 71 
Cambridge Law Journal 355-383 [Rowbottom (2012)]. This work will be returned to later. 
51
 Professor Barendt has identified the ‘democracy rationale’ as the ‘most influential theory in the 
development of 20th century free speech law’: E. Barendt, Freedom of Speech 2nd edn (Oxford: OUP, 2005), 
18, 20. 
52
 [1993] AC 534. 
53
 A. Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford: OUP, 1999).  
54
 On this point see for example Eady J’s remarks in CTB v News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2011] EWHC 
1326 (QB), [25]: ‘It may be thought that the wish of NGN to publish more about this “story”, with a view 
to selling newspapers and perhaps achieving other commercial advantages, demonstrates that coverage has 
not yet reached its saturation point. Had it done so, the story would no longer retain any interest. … the 
alternative argument … that The Sun should at least be allowed to tell the Claimant’s wife what it knows, 
or thinks it knows. This is a difficult one to follow. NGN is a media group legitimately interested in making 
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path, though, is not surprising when one considers that the trajectory is the product of 
years of litigation involving news media publishers (often as defendants).55 Technology 
has prompted renewed consideration. Social media platforms have now vaulted the 
individual into a novel dimension that challenges the domain held by traditional news 
agencies. As noted by the European Court of Human Rights, social media (as a form of 
communication via the internet) ‘has now become one of the principal means by which 
individuals exercise their right to freedom of expression and information, providing as it 
does essential tools for participation in activities and discussions concerning political 
issues and issues of general interest.’56 
 
The Defamation Act 2013 maintains the hierarchy of traditional news media, situating 
social media as a lower form of speech (not worth regulating in concert with news media). 
The continuation of this paradigm challenges the notion of free speech. In their critique 
of the legislation, Mullis and Scott point to the lost opportunity to promote discourse in 
the Act’s remedies.57 This example furthers the present critique. Section 12 permits the 
court to order publication of a summary of a judgment. Section 13 grants the court power 
to compel the taking down of material found to be defamatory. To this the authors 
respond: ‘Mandated discursive remedies – such as corrections, retractions, and rights of 
reply – could serve to vindicate reputation, to promote freedom of expression, and to 
secure the provision to the general public of the fullest possible information on matters of 
collective importance.’58 These proposed remedies arguably better enact the good of free 
speech concept. They encourage dialogue using traditional media as a conduit. Their 
absence is just as instructive as their presence would have been. There is a corrective 
underpinning to these sections of the Defamation Act 2013, more regulation than 
stimulation. The Act holds ‘offenders’ to account through recrimination in the form of a 
judgment summary against the publisher, if not being mandated to take down the 
impugned publication. With these remedies, the Act entrenches a print media paradigm 
where news media publications are the definitive and final statement on a topic. 
Traditional media, in the Act, epitomize sources of discussion and therefore are placed in 
a special realm.59 As an alternative though complementary strain, social media offers an 
                                                                                                                                                 
profits from communicating to the world at large. It surely does not aspire to the role of social worker or 
“relationship counsellor”.’ This case marked a breakdown in the injunction process as the identity of the at 
that time unnamed claimant was later revealed after being the subject of much internet speculation. For a 
summary of the events surrounding the case see A. Murray, Information Technology Law: The Law and 
Society (Oxford: OUP, 2013) [Murray], 144. 
55
 Rowbottom has noted this development: Rowbottom (2012), 359. A concern with the melding of free 
speech and commercial interests has a long history. In their seminal article of 1890, Brandeis and Warren 
contended that the ‘press is overstepping in every direction the obvious bounds of propriety and of decency 
… [having] invaded the sacred precincts of private and domestic life’.S. D. Warren & L.D. Brandeis, ‘The 
Right to Privacy’ (1890) 4 Harvard Law Review 193 [Warren & Brandeis], 196. The intermingling of 
defamation and privacy law is a compelling topic, but one which requires its own space beyond that 
permitted here. 
56
 Yildirim v Turkey [2012] ECHR 2074, [56]. Mullis & Scott have also written on the notion of taking free 
speech seriously: A. Mullis & A. Scott, ‘Reframing libel: Taking (all) rights seriously and where it leads’ in 
D. Capper (ed.), Modern Defamation law: Balancing Reputation and Free Expression (Belfast: Queens 
University Belfast Press, 2012) [Mullis & Scott (2012)], 1-21. 
57
 The discussion continues on from one they started in Mullis & Scott (2012), 15. 
58
 Mullis & Scott (2014), 107. 
59
 Perhaps this is why there is a charter regulating the UK press. 
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interactive version of news where print news is published to an online source and the 
story may be shared or posted to alternate sites with comments attached; drawing readers 
into stories through participation.60 A profound opportunity has been passed up. The 
combination of social and news media may extend the organic nature of discussion. 
(ii) Social media as a lower form of speech 
The perceived lower value of social media comments reveals an inherent ranking of 
speech. It openly contradicts the ideal of neutrality; a fiction maintained in defamation 
law where formal ranking of publications has not been undertaken. Courts have only 
written of different readerships in considering whether a comment is defamatory.61 And 
yet, the public may unofficially rank publications in some manner (for example by 
perceived quality). This behaviour would be consistent with the marketplace of ideas 
concept that leaves to the individual reader such a choice.62 Rowbottom has provided the 
language of high and low level speech.63 This categorization has brought the discussion 
further along (notably as it combines the medium of speech with a notion of its value).64  
 
Take the example of Singh; though the matter was not considered in the Court of 
Appeal’s decision. The defendant was a respected commentator on science with what 
may be called respected credentials. Employing the marketplace metaphor, his remarks 
may be regarded as being of a high level because he has published his remarks in a news 
media outlet coupled with the added value of his background.65 In contrast, the ‘default’ 
view of social media as a form of speech less worthy of protection (coupled with the 
presumption that remarks made on the medium are of no value) must be changed as the 
considerations deserve recognition of the nuanced issues. This is not to suggest, however, 
that social media speech should be given relaxed treatment. The ‘irresponsible blogger’66 
must also be made to think before publishing a remark online. Rather, the focus is on 
finding the balance between the great tool of social media as a means of dialogue versus 
its potential as a basis for liability.  
 
                                                 
60
 The publishers’ editing privileges of the comments section on their websites is an issue to be further 
explored.  
61
 See for example Thornton v Telegraph Media Group Ltd [2010] EWHC 1414. 
62
 D. Mangan, ‘An Argument for the Common Law Defence of Honest Comment’ (2011) 16 
Communications Law 140-147, 144. 
63
 Rowbottom (2012), 357: ‘The term “high level” is adopted here to refer to expression that is 
professionally produced, aimed at a wide audience, is well resourced and researched in advance. By 
contrast, the “low level” refers to amateur content that is spontaneous, inexpensive to produce, and is often 
akin to everyday conversation. With “low level” communications, lower standards of responsibility will 
normally be expected of the speaker than of a professional mass media entity.’ (357) He has also provided a 
diagram outlining his classification: J. Rowbottom, ‘In the shadow of the big media: freedom of expression, 
participation and the production of knowledge online’ (2014) Public Law 491-511 [Rowbottom (2014)], 
494. 
64
 The language continues the view of speech by an individual on a user-generated platform as being of a 
low level without noting the blurred lines created by news media using the popular spontaneous platforms 
available to all with online access. 
65
 The European Court of Human Rights’ decision in Mosley v UK (2011) 53 E.H.R.R. 30, [114], also 
suggests a ranking of speech where reporting on lurid, personal details does not attract the ‘robust 
protection’ of Article 10.  
66
 Phillipson, 170. 
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The decision of the employment tribunal in Crisp v Apple Retail (UK) Ltd. 67  sets a 
backdrop for further elaboration. There, the tribunal upheld Apple’s decision to terminate 
Crisp’s employment for posting comments critical of the Apple workplace and its 
products.68 The issue was one of misconduct and the test in English law is rather elastic. 
Emphasis was placed on the ‘great importance of image to the company’.69 Even though 
Crisp did not identify himself as an Apple employee on his Facebook page, the tribunal 
was satisfied that the friends to which these comments were accessible (Crisp had 
restricted the visibility of his comments to only his friends) knew that Apple employed 
him.70 He also did not have control over his friends’ ability to pass on the remarks.71 The 
claimant’s freedom of expression argument was dismissed on the basis that his comments, 
first, were deemed unimportant to freedom of expression as compared with political 
opinions and, second, were damaging to Apple’s reputation.72 
 
Criticism of the ruling here challenges the first basis above and elaborates on the second. 
The tribunal was remarkably certain that Crisp’s comments were of a low level/low value 
and as such not worthy of protection. However, the mention of ‘political opinion’ as an 
example of higher quality speech prompts a troubling suggestion: remarks made on social 
media pertaining to the workplace are not sufficiently worthy of protection.73 Some of the 
claimant’s comments related to the functionality of Apple products and so the question of 
a public interest could have also been arguable, especially given the prominent sales of 
these items. Protection from reputational harm is not an absolute right, for defamation 
law permits challenges to reputation. In this instance, the challenge by Crisp was that 
Apple products may not function properly. Speech limited to remarks solely about 
government via conventional forms of media would be a remarkably small area for 
protection.74 Although it was not an issue here, the tribunal seemed closed off to any 
notion of public interest in workers’ speech such as whistleblowing. There may well be a 
public interest in discussing matters pertaining to private entities (for example, because of 
the products they sell to the public as consumers). The idea that only remarks analogical 
to political speech are to be protected stands out as unusually limited.   
 
The sounder basis for upholding the dismissal in Crisp can be broadly placed under the 
notion of fidelity or loyalty. The claimant was at liberty to express opinions as he had but 
he must also have accepted the employer’s response to those comments by dismissing 
him. Crisp’s comments carried the potential to harm the company’s reputation and in so 
                                                 
67
 ET/1500258/11 [Crisp]. 
68
 Ibid, [14]. 
69
 Ibid, [39]. 
70
 This factor must be impeachable as a determining consideration because (at least some) Facebook friends 
would presumably know some personal details such as employment history, independent of a Facebook 
profile. 
71
 In this case a co-worker passed on his comments to Apple: Crisp, [44]-[45]. 
72
 Ibid, [46]. 
73
 This is in contrast to other jurisdictions, such as the United States, where the matter can fall under 
statutory protection, such as s.7 of the US National Labor Relations Act 29 USC ∫ 151 (1935). 
74
 Baroness Hale’s unequivocal direction in Jameel v Wall Street Journal Europe Sprl [2006] UKHL 44, 
[147] remains applicable: ‘the most vapid tittle-tattle about the activities of footballers’ wives and 
girlfriends interests large sections of the public but no-one could claim any real public interest in being told 
about it.’ 
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doing transgressed the boundaries of employee fidelity to an employer. The tone of his 
postings (especially if one considers that his first mention of the matter was on his 
Facebook page) went beyond the measure of mere remarks (let alone whistleblowing), as 
the motive was to impugn his employer.75 Crisp should be the subject of significant 
criticism because of its casual treatment of speech on social media. While his remarks 
may have been low level and of little value, this ruling fell short of exploring this 
spectrum in a proper manner. More nuanced decision-making must be demanded, 
especially relating to developing media for expression. 
 
 
V. Freedom to participate 
The Defamation Act 2013 has created a new issue with regards to free speech which is 
encapsulated in the phrase freedom to participate. 76  The public’s right to know has 
underpinned the justification for free speech where traditional news media facilitate this 
knowledge. With the 2013 Act, the premise has shifted to the individual’s right to 
participate. The difference between the public’s right to know and the individual’s right 
to participate may be nuanced, but it is an important distinction to consider because the 
new Act takes regulation a step further away from responsibility. This is most noticeable 
when looking at the defence of publication on a matter of public interest (s.4). User-
generated platforms (such as social media) provide the ready-made means for 
contribution. The subjective benchmark of the publisher believing the statement was on a 
matter of public interest also reinforces the participatory aspects of expression. However, 
the provision does not speak of responsible publication and reference to the objective test 
of a reasonable belief (s.4(1)(b)) falls short of acting as a control mechanism in favour of 
this aim. When it comes to freedom of expression, the terrain is open when one speaks of 
the public interest. Equally wide, unfortunately, is the potential for harm to reputation (as 
protected by the European Convention of Human Rights)77 via user-generated internet 
platforms.  
 
(i) Expression in social media as participation 
There are different means of expression in social media. One popular form is the 
expression of immediate mood. To this point, the extent of user sharing of personal 
information has been remarkable. The cathartic undertone found on the various platforms 
reveals not just ease with sharing intimate details but also a desire to seek out 
connectedness based on shared experiences. As meritorious actions, these traits may be 
                                                 
75
 The European Court of Human Rights found that where the intention of the worker was to damage the 
employer’s reputation, the speech did not contribute to social debate: R Predota  v Austria , App. No. 
14621/06, decision of 18 January 2000. A decision of the Leuven Labour Tribunal takes a similar path to 
that noted here: 17 November 2011, (2012) 46 Revue du Droit des Technologies de l’Information 79. The 
critical statements of a business development manager on his Facebook account constituted serious 
misconduct warranting dismissal because of the company’s communications policy; his work as a manager; 
and finally as a result of the timing of the comments which came about when the CEO had been reassuring 
markets about the company’s strength.  
76
 Words other than participate have been debated and put aside. For example, argument (or even dispute) 
could be inserted. However, as Gardner has noted, the word ‘has distracting overtones on both sides’: 
Gardner, 163. 
77
 Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v Ukraine (33014/05) (2014) 58 E.H.R.R. 28, [63] 
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classed as self-actualisation: individuals exploring notions of identity and community. 
More often, self-actualisation has been a face of the ‘good’ of free speech. Still, this is 
not the extent of speech as social media evidences. Frequently these expressions are made 
so as to elicit commentary from others. In this way, expression of mood segues into the 
next form. 
 
More on point for the present discussion, a statement of opinion such as a critique, 
ridicule or correction (this is not an exhaustive listing) is another common form of social 
media expression.78 An intriguing interaction is created here and it links with the format 
of a defamation action. A relative relationship is established where the defendant 
instigates an association with another person by her comments. The claimant’s retort 
indicates his subjective interpretation of the remark as having crossed a boundary. The 
problem in defamation law, exacerbated by social media, is who has the authority to curb 
what we say? Defendants do not automatically accept the personal assessment of 
claimants. Courts stand in an authoritative role to some extent. However, when it comes 
to free speech, there is a curious duality: greater reluctance to cede ground with this right; 
and yet, the right is also acknowledged to be fettered. At its core, defamation law permits 
a claimant to demand of a defendant ‘why did you say that about me?’79 Herein lies a 
foundation for holding a person to account for what s/he writes about someone else on 
social media.80 There is a relational responsibility: we enjoy the liberty to say what we 
will about any other individual, but that individual has a right to call us to account for the 
remark.81 The responsibility arises from the relationship created by B commenting on A’s 
statement. In this way, defamation is part of the tort law framework because it ‘defines 
duties not to injure others and leaves those who have breached such duties vulnerable to 
their victims’ demands for responsive action.’ 82  Into this space, regulation for 
responsibility in social media may be inserted. 
 
McAlpine v Bercow83 illustrates the scenario. This decision on the issue of seriousness 
contains much material to be unpacked (though space does not permit such extensive 
                                                 
78
 The Canadian labour arbitration decisions of City of Toronto v. TPFFA, Local 3888 v Grievance 
(Edwards), 2014 CanLII 62879 and City of Toronto v TPFFA, Local 3888 (Bowman), unreported (12 
November 2014) 2014 CanLII 76886 arose from an instance of correction on social media. 
79
 In this manner, putting aside debate on the different forms of responsibility, Gardner’s comment that ‘the 
value of basic responsibility … is instantiated in, rather than instrumentally served by, the legal process’ 
remains a pertinent observation: J. Gardner, ‘The Mark of Responsibility’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 157-171 [Gardner], 168. The threshold of seriousness in s.1 of the 2013 Act is noted. 
80
 Daniel Solove has identified punishing those who abuse such complaints as a means of maintaining some 
level of integrity with these complaints: D. Solove, ‘Speech, Privacy and Reputation on the Internet’ in S. 
Levemore and M. Nussbaum (eds), The Offensive Internet (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011) 
15-30. 
81
 The concept is distinguishable from others such as outcome-responsibility, as outlined by S.R. Perry, 
‘The Moral Foundations of Tort Law’ (1992) 77 Iowa Law Review 449. While liability in both scenarios 
requires the pre-condition of the defendant’s voluntary action which leads to the claimant’s harm, the moral 
reasons for action in relation to this outcome are not necessarily present in defamation. In other words, the 
moral responsibility requiring the defendant to indemnify is highly debatable when speech is the impugned 
subject matter.  
82
 Goldberg & Zipursky, 18. This quotation is taken from the cited authors’ statement of tort law in general 
and adapted to show how defamation fits within tort.  
83
 [2013] EWHC 1342 [McAlpine]. 
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engagement). Despite one of the stated purposes of the Defamation Act 2013 being to 
reduce the influence of affluence in defamation litigation, McAlpine clearly demonstrates 
the contrary: the ability of financially secure individuals to protect themselves from social 
media defamation. This case also dramatizes the speed with which stories (accurate or 
otherwise) spread via social media. Perhaps the most troubling aspect, McAlpine 
underlines the law’s lethargy in meeting the challenge posed by social media. Five 
hundred was the arbitrary figure the claimant set for pursuing legal action against 
defendants:84 if a statement was made by an individual on his/her Twitter account linking 
Lord McAlpine to paedophilia and that individual had fewer than 500 followers, s/he 
would be asked ‘only’ to make a donation to charity. Those who made the impugned 
comments and had more than 500 followers would be the subjects of legal challenge. It 
must be asked: on what basis is 500 followers the threshold for legal action? In Crisp, the 
employment tribunal was satisfied that simply sharing the claimant’s negative comments 
about his employer to any audience was a factor in upholding his dismissal. The criticism 
here is not directed at Tugendhat J, for he had no role in determining the 500 followers 
threshold. Rather, McAlpine underlines how litigants are steering the process with regards 
to social media libel85 and that neither the common law nor Parliament are offering much 
guidance.86   
 
For the current discussion, McAlpine is important because it raises the question of 
responsibility for comments on social media. Widely reported, the offending comment 
was made on Twitter by the celebrity defendant – ‘“Why is Lord McAlpine trending? 
*Innocent face*”’ 87  – at a time the claimant was wrongfully (it was subsequently 
established) being associated with paedophilia throughout various social media (the 
reason his name was trending). Bercow insinuated criminal activity: ‘it is by implication 
a repetition of the accusation with the addition of the name which had previously been 
omitted.’88 It should be of little surprise that the court found the remark to have been 
serious and that Bercow’s defence (‘the question she asked in her Tweet was simply a 
question’) 89  did nothing to direct attention away from this conclusion. The ruling 
suggested that an individual’s claim, on social media, of innocently asking a question 
                                                 
84
 Of interest, in the Canadian labour decision Lougheed Imports Ltd (cob West Coast Mazda) v United 
Food and Commercial Workers International Union (2010) 186 CLRBR (2d) 82, the arbitrator found that 
the grievors’ Facebook audience of 500 was a wide one to which the derogatory comments were 
disseminated. 
85
 A noteworthy exception, though in the privacy setting, is the #IamSpartacus response to the legal team in 
CTB who threatened to seek out offending Twitter account holders by way of a Norwich Pharmacal order: 
Murray, 145. 
86
 The critique here is that surely we can develop a more advanced system than pointing to updated uses of 
civil procedure decisions such as Norwich Pharmacal orders pursuant to Norwich Pharmacal Co v 
Commissioners of Customs and Excise [1974] AC 133 (HL). This critique is not limited to the UK. A 
similar remark may be made of other common law jurisdictions. See for example, The Law Society of 
Upper Canada Special Lectures 2012: Employment Law and the New Workplace in the Social Media Age 
(Toronto: Irwin Law, 2013). The regulatory force of user policies devised by private entities such as 
YouTube may also be critiqued: Mac Síthigh, 82. 
87
 McAlpine, [3]. 
88
 Ibid, [87]. 
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 Ibid, [34]. 
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which itself was an innuendo of criminal activity will not necessarily avoid her 
responsibility for publishing the remark as she had.  
 
To this point, the difficulties have been discussed. As noted above, there is nuance to the 
change brought in by the 2013 Act: it does touch on a positive. Encouraging the public to 
participate in issues of public interest remains laudable and in some ways new 
technologies facilitate this laudable end. And yet, within the phrase freedom to participate 
is also a critique of the notion of free speech. Freedom to participate ties together free 
speech with responsibility in what is said. Freedom to participate takes into consideration 
developments in technology permitting each person to be a publisher of comments. 
Where the individual is now in a position similar to a publisher in the traditional 
understanding of defamation law,90 so too responsibilities must be enforced: ‘freedom of 
expression carries with it duties and responsibilities and any person who chooses to 
disclose information must carefully verify, to the extent permitted by the circumstances 
that it is accurate and reliable.’91 The concept of freedom to participate may also be 
harnessed as a means compelling individuals to be informed regarding the subject matter 
of their comments.92 A discussion regarding a general responsibility to be informed when 
making comments on social media may prove to be a worthwhile endeavour. While an 
exploration is beyond the present scope, it is worth noting that there are a host of social 
issues within this topic. ‘Class’ is relevant here because of considerations such as socio-
economic standing and educational background. For the present discussion, the critique 
of this part of the legislation is aimed solely at the statute’s inadequacy as a framework 
for responsible publication.   
 
(ii) Participation: the intermingling of defamation and privacy law 
Freedom to participate as an informing notion to the parameters of speech brings together 
the law’s considerations in defamation and privacy. 93  As stated earlier, Warren and 
Brandeis pioneered the conversation regarding privacy and in so doing they spoke to the 
connection between rights and responsibilities. Defamation and privacy have been 
gradually moving towards each other in the early twenty-first century. 94  These two 
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 McCloskey J made this connection in AB v Facebook Ireland Ltd [2013] NIQB 14, [8], where he found 
the content posted to the social media platform to have been comparable to publication in a leading page of 
a major newspaper or in a popular television programme. 
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 Heinisch v Germany [2011] IRLR 923, [67]. 
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 The law cannot mandate being informed. As hinted at above, this is too large a landscape to legislate as 
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93
 The connection between defamation and privacy recalls the reduced role given to Article 8 in UK 
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argument put forward here is that while defamation and privacy (specifically the tort of misuse of private 
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Slander 12th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2013), vi, [22.1]. Though data on actions in these two areas 
remain incomplete: J. Townend, ‘Closed Data: Defamation and Privacy Disputes in England and Wales’ 
(2013) 5 Journal of Media Law 31-44.  
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categories of law contain restrictions on what may be published online via social media. 
The former has been discussed at length, coming to the conclusion that there is little 
restriction applied by this discipline (though there is scope to better enforce 
responsibility). 95  Integrating free speech considerations, the common law of privacy 
provides some instruction.  
 
The overlap between defamation and privacy is illustrated through the test for the tort of 
misuse of personal information that juxtaposes free speech with privacy considerations: 
1) Does the claimant have a ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’ in respect of the information in 
question? If yes, then:  
2) Does the claimant’s interest in maintaining their right to informational privacy outweigh the 
defendant’s interest in publishing the information in pursuit of their right to freedom of 
expression?96 
Lord Hoffmann further drew out the connection between privacy and defamation in 
describing this tort as a ‘cause of action … [which] focuses upon … the right to control 
the dissemination of information about one’s private life and the right to the esteem and 
respect of other people’.97 Under this framework, some decisions offer guidelines. For 
example, McKennitt v Ash98 held information obtained in a confidential situation cannot 
be subsequently published without violating privacy rights. The defendant, a former close 
friend of the claimant musician, tried to publish information she obtained in confidence 
from the claimant. These were prime factors in the court’s decision that the claimant’s 
Article 8 rights should prevail. 99  For social media users, this decision suggests 
information obtained in confidence and then published may transgress Art. 8 rights. An 
interesting circumstance in Rocknroll v News Group Newspapers Ltd. 100  adds to the 
discussion. There the claimant successfully argued there was a reasonable expectation of 
privacy for photos of him partially naked at private party with friends and family that 
were subsequently posted by a fellow attendee onto the attendee’s Facebook page. A 
newspaper later obtained these photos when Facebook permitted public access to pages 
and threatened to publish them.101    
 
When there is a duty or interest in disclosing information, the decision in Clift v Slough 
BC102 illustrates that proportionality will be an operating factor. Ms Clift witnessed the 
damaging of some flowerbeds. She was threatened when she intervened. On the advice of 
the police, she called Slough's anti-social behaviour co-ordinator, Ms Rachid. The 
conversation went very poorly and angry words were exchanged. The claimant 
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 Based on the emphasis on privacy, a similar conclusion seems to have been reached in D.L. Solove, The 
Future of Reputation (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), chapter 8. 
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 As stated in a number of cases: see for example Campbell v MGN [2004] UKHL 22 [Campbell] and the 
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 [2013] EWHC 24 (Ch.). 
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terminated the call and she subsequently wrote a very strongly worded letter of complaint 
about Ms Rachid's conduct. Slough investigated, and rejected the complaint. It found her 
behaviour to Rachid was violent and threatening. It placed a 'marker' against her name for 
18 months. And her name was placed on a register of violent persons. Details were sent 
to those with whom Clift might have contact, and to four wide categories of people 
connected with Slough. Clift sued in libel. The Court of Appeal accepted that the council 
had an obligation to inform those other groups who provided services to Clift since she 
had uttered threats against a Council employee. The court ruled the council had advised 
an overly broad range of agencies in that Clift had been added to the Violent Persons 
Register and so had violated the claimant's privacy right. While overly broad 
dissemination may prove to be a problematic basis for determining legal protection, an 
important question is the interest of the intended audience.103   
 
If there is a guiding term for the interconnection of privacy and defamation (especially in 
the social media context), it may be intrusion. Writing about privacy, Mister Justice 
Eady104 observed: ‘it is important always to remember that the modern law of privacy is 
not concerned solely with information or “secrets”: it is also concerned importantly with 
intrusion’.105 The publication of information about an individual by another on his social 
media platform to a wide audience intrudes upon the claimant’s personhood. In law, the 
intrusion may be viewed as a matter of privacy and/or as one of libel.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
The Defamation Act 2013 remains disappointing as a piece of twenty-first century 
legislation. While it contains a critique of the common law to that point in time, the Act 
itself does nothing to effectively guide libel law in an era of expanding forms of 
expression. Instead, it retains the hierarchical approach to libel where traditional news 
media represent the pinnacle of free speech; a remarkable notion when one considers the 
exponential growth of social media platforms.  
 
The aim of the present work has been to draw out a discussion of the responsible use of 
social media. The Defamation Act 2013 contains a singular vision of free speech as an 
unqualified good. And so, one may say this is not the ideal moment for considerations 
looking to limit free expression. To the contrary, this is the very moment to do so. The 
common law has been touching on this topic ever so carefully. More pointed 
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consideration of the handmaids of free speech (rights and responsibilities) must be 
undertaken with a view to developing parameters for enforcement of both while 
recognizing the remarkable expansion of platforms for free speech.  
 
 
 
